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This paper contributes to the resolution of the rights offer paradox, using a database of French 
SEOs. We first document higher direct flotation costs, but also improved stock market 
liquidity after public offerings and standby rights relative to uninsured rights. We find that 
blockholder renouncements to subscribe to new shares and stock market liquidity are 
important determinants of flotation method choice. After controlling for endogeneity in the 
choice of flotation method, we find that public offerings are cost effective and more liquidity 
improving than standby rights whereas an uninsured rights offering is the best choice for low 
liquidity, closely held firms. Our results provide new insights as to why firms choose public 
offerings despite apparently higher costs.  
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1.  Introduction 
 
The rights offer paradox, first observed by Smith (1977), highlights that large US firms 
use the more costly underwritten flotation method rather than rights offerings to conduct 
SEOs. This observation is not restricted to U.S. offerings. Several authors document a trend 
away from rights in other countries (Eckbo, Masulis and Norli, 2007). However, even if their 
direct costs are by far the lowest, rights issues may incur indirect costs that could make their 
total costs larger for some issuers. In this paper, we focus on liquidity as an indirect cost of 
rights issues. We study the French market where firms can choose among three major SEO 
flotation methods: uninsured rights, standby rights and public offerings. We examine 
interactions between market liquidity, flotation costs and the flotation method choice. We 
make three contributions to understanding the rights offer paradox. First, we document that 
flotation costs decrease with market liquidity for public offerings. Second, we observe 
liquidity improvements after SEOs vary according to flotation method, and find that 
uninsured rights issues have the least favorable effect on liquidity. Third, we find that besides 
blockholders’ takeup, liquidity is a major determinant of the flotation method choice. Low 
liquidity firms prefer uninsured rights to avoid large underwriting fees. Our analysis suggests 
that accounting for endogeneity in flotation method choices is important in measuring their 
effect on costs and liquidity. After controlling for endogeneity, we find that public offerings 
are less expensive and improve liquidity more than standby rights whereas uninsured rights 
are still the best choice for low liquidity, closely held firms.  
Liquidity is an important factor for investors and managers investment decisions. Illiquid 
assets must deliver higher returns to compensate investors for the higher trading costs they 
incur (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986). The empirical evidence confirms that firms’ required 
rates of return significantly relate to various liquidity proxies, such as spreads (Chalmers and 
Kadlec, 1998), turnover rates (Datar et al., 1998), and adverse selection costs (Brennan and 
Subrahmanyam, 1996). In addition, a recent strand of the literature (Acharya and Pedersen, 
2005, Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003) argues that liquidity itself is a source of risk. To the 
extent that liquidity is reflected in prices, liquidity is also an important determinant of the cost 
of capital (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986, 1989).  
Examining the link between SEOs flotation costs and liquidity is a different way to test 
whether liquidity matters to firms. Butler, Grullon and Weston (2005) find that SEO 
investment bank fees are substantially lower for firms with more liquid stocks. Altinkilic 





flotation costs. However, market making costs vary with liquidity. Altinkilic (2001) finds that 
for the most liquid issuing firms, there is little compensation for market making present in the 
spread. In contrast, for the less liquid issuing firms, a third of the lead bank’s compensation is 
to cover market making activity.  
Neither Butler et al (2005), nor Altinkilic (2001) consider rights issues. Uninsured rights 
typically do not benefit from market making activities. In standby rights, issuers hire 
underwriters who provide market making on both rights and shares markets. However, large 
discounts inherent in rights issues and high current shareholder subscription rates make 
market liquidity a less important factor for underwriters. Therefore, low liquidity firms may 
switch to rights issues whose costs are less sensitive to liquidity. 
We examine whether a lesser improvement in liquidity may be an indirect cost of rights 
issues. Several U.S. papers have studied the effect of fully underwritten offerings on stocks’ 
secondary market liquidity.
1 Lease, Masulis, and Page (1993) find significant increases in 
trading volume and the daily number of trades and decreases in bid-ask spreads following 
equity offerings and Denis and Kadlec (1994) find significant increases in share turnover, the 
daily number of trades, and the fraction of days with trading of shares. Tripathy and Rao 
(1992) find that bid-ask spreads narrow after equity offerings, but the degree of reduction and 
the timing differ depending on firm size. None of these studies investigate whether the impact 
of SEOs on liquidity depends on flotation method, but Kothare (1997) documents that bid-ask 
spreads widen after rights issues and narrow after public offerings, effects she ascribes to the 
fact that ownership becomes more diffuse after public offerings and more concentrated after 
rights issues. However, her results may be driven by the large proportion of financially-
distressed firms in her sample. Qian (2005) compares liquidity changes associated with public 
offerings to liquidity changes after private placements on the NYSE, Amex and Nasdaq. He 
finds that the stock of issuing firms becomes more liquid after a public offering, whereas there 
is no change in liquidity after a private placement. Outside the U.S., Gardängen (2006) 
analyzes the effect of rights issues on stock liquidity on the Stockholm Stock Exchange where 
rights are predominant and finds no evidence of a change in liquidity after rights issues.  
We argue that ex ante liquidity is a major determinant of the flotation method choice. 
Myers and Majluf (1984) and Eckbo and Masulis (1992) argue that firms decide to issue 
equity when the net present value of investment exceeds the cost of issuing equity. A low 
liquidity firm that chooses a public offering will incur large costs because market making is 





stock and more reluctant to underwrite the issue. If the flotation costs prove to be too high, 
managers will cancel the issue. The probability and cost of a SEO cancellation are important 
components of expected flotation costs.
2 We argue that when a public offering is expected to 
be too costly, managers may shift to another flotation method, standby rights or uninsured 
rights.  
Kothare (1997) does not directly examine the impact of liquidity on the choice of a 
flotation method. However, in her Table 1, although rights offering firms are benchmarked to 
public offering firms with closest market capitalization in the same year, the proportionate 
spread is 0.1131 for rights issuance whereas the proportionate spread is 0.0719 for public 
offering firms. Thus, the pre-SEO liquidity differs between firms using rights versus public 
offerings.  
In the U.S., rights offers are virtually non-existent. However, liquidity is still a 
determinant of flotation method choice. Gao and Ritter (2008) analyze three SEO offering 
methods: bought deals, accelerated bookbuilt offers, and fully marketed deals. They find that 
a larger bid-ask spread decreases the probability of an accelerated offer over a fully marketed 
offer. Since bid-ask spreads are a measure of liquidity, their results indicate that firms with 
lower liquidity favor fully marketed offers. Further, they document that, after controlling for 
various offer and firm characteristics, including bid-ask spreads, fully marketed offers pay an 
average 3% higher gross spread than accelerated SEOs. Less liquid firms prefer fully 
marketed offer and pay higher fees.  
We argue that liquidity affects the costs and benefits analysis of flotation method and 
affects the flotation method choice. Thus, we re-examine the rights offer paradox after 
accounting for the endogeneity of the issuing firm’s choice regarding flotation methods. We 
study whether flotation cost differences and changes in post SEO liquidity are still 
significantly different among the flotation methods, using 2SLS regression analysis. 
We use a hand collected dataset containing 178 SEOs by French firms over the period 
1995 to 2006. The dataset includes information on SEO characteristics, abnormal 
announcement returns, flotation costs, and measures of intraday liquidity. We compare three 
flotation methods: standby rights issues, uninsured rights and public offerings. The French 
institutional setting is appropriate for these tests for several reasons. First, French firms have 
the freedom to choose among the three different flotation methods. We can therefore compare 
the effects of ex ante liquidity on the choice of a flotation method as well as the consequences 





whereas in the U.S., utilities, closed-end funds, REITS, and more recently financial distressed 
firms are the primary users of rights offerings (Heron and Lie, 2004, and Ursel, 2006), in 
France large publicly traded corporations frequently choose this flotation method. 
Furthermore, while there has been a trend away from rights offerings in the 1990s, rights 
offerings have not disappeared, and large firms still choose this method. Third, a distinctive 
feature of French firms is the high concentration in ownership (Faccio and Lang, 2002). In the 
case where current shareholders renounce subscription to the newly issued shares, SEOs will 
dilute blockholder ownership and increase trading, whatever issuance method is chosen.  
For public offerings, we find that flotation costs are greater when pre-offering liquidity is 
high. We find that both mean and median liquidity improves significantly after public 
offerings, but only the median improves for rights issues, whether standby or uninsured. 
Further, we document that, in addition to blockholders’ takeup, ex ante liquidity is an 
important determinant of flotation method choice. Firms with large blockholders choose 
between rights and public offerings depending on the willingness of the blockholders to 
subscribe to new share and the firm stock liquidity. When blockholders renounce subscription 
to the new shares, firms prefer public offerings. When blockholders choose to subscribe, the 
rights offering method is preferred and liquidity drives the choice between standby and 
uninsured rights. Firms with low liquidity choose uninsured rights whereas firms with high 
liquidity opt for standby rights; bankers agree to underwrite rights offerings if there is 
sufficient liquidity for them to be a market maker. By controlling for endogeneity via 2SLS 
methodology, we are able to take into account these determinants of the flotation method 
choice. The first step regression is a multinomial logit model of the flotation method choice 
and the second step regressions explain flotation costs and abnormal post SEO liquidity. We 
find that uninsured rights are the least expensive flotation method, but generate the smallest 
improvement in market liquidity. However, when rights offerings are accompanied by an 
underwriting contract, they become more expensive than public offerings. Public offerings are 
the best method to improve post-SEO liquidity. Our results confirm that liquidity is an 
important factor for the resolution of the rights offer paradox. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the institutional 
setting and our hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the sample construction and our data. Section 








2.  Institutional environment and hypotheses 
 
2.1.  SEOs institutional framework 
 
French firms can choose between three flotation methods: rights issues, which are 
underwritten (standby rights) or not (uninsured rights), and public offerings. In contrast to the 
US, rights offerings are the predominant flotation method in France, although French firms 
select the public offering method more frequently than in other closely held markets. The 
French institutional setting for public offerings differs from the U.S. A purchase priority can 
be offered on a pro rata basis to current shareholders over an average three-day period. In 
contrast to rights, this purchase priority cannot be traded. The offer price is set before the 
announcement of the SEO according to the following rules. Until February 2005, the 
minimum offer price had to be as large as the average price over a period of 10 consecutive 
trading days selected among the 20 days preceding the issuing date. Since 2005, it must be at 
least equal to the average price over the 3-day period preceding the offer and the maximum 
discount is 5%. Among our public offerings, there are a few accelerated bookbuildings. 
Accelerated bookbuilt offerings are executed in one to three days on average, compared to 
five to seven days for traditional bookbuildings.
3 Due to the small number of observations, we 
do not analyse the two sets of bookbuilt offerings separately. 
 
 
2.2.  Hypotheses 
 
Direct flotation costs decrease as market liquidity increases 
 
Several authors have provided evidence on flotation costs and their determinants (for 
example, Smith, 1977, Eckbo and Masulis, 1992 and Slovin, Sushka and Lai, 2000). 
Underwriter fees represent a large part of the direct flotation costs. Altinkilic and Hansen 
(2000) find that relative underwriting costs increase with the firm’s total risk measured by the 
standard deviation of returns, increase with the percent change in shares, and decrease with 
the offer size. 
  Butler, Grullon and Weston (2005) study the importance of stock liquidity as a 
determinant of flotation costs. The rationale for why liquidity might be important is that costs 
faced by the underwriters are similar to intermediation costs supported by dealers or block 
traders. It is easier for the underwriters to place the new shares when market liquidity is high. 





market making, Altinkilic (2001) finds that on average market making represents 20% of the 
underwriter’s compensation. Butler, Grullon and Weston (2005) also document a robust 
inverse relationship between the total fees paid to investment banks and the stock liquidity of 
the issuing firm. They find the effect of liquidity is stronger for large offerings than for small 
offerings and suggest that the effect of liquidity on flotation costs is stronger when liquidity 
matters the most. Further, Altinkilic (2001) finds that for the less liquid issuing firms, a third 
of the lead bank’s compensation is to cover market making activities, whereas for the most 
liquid firms, there is little compensation for market making. 
However, the previous literature does not consider rights issues. Our hypothesis is that 
liquidity is an important determinant of direct flotation costs for public offerings, but less so 
for rights issues. Uninsured rights typically do not benefit from market making activities. If 
current shareholders resell their rights on organized exchanges, there are brokerage fees, 
which are avoided by subscribing to new shares. Further, even in standby rights, the large 
discount inherent in rights issues, and the fact that rights may not be traded at all make market 
liquidity a less important factor for underwriters. In the case where current shareholders take 
up all their rights, there are no transaction costs, and liquidity does not matter. Thus, ceteris 
paribus, low liquidity firms will prefer rights issues whose costs are less sensitive to liquidity. 
 
 
Liquidity increases more after public offerings compared to rights 
 
An equity offering involves changes in trading volume, volatility and information 
asymmetry, which in turn impact liquidity. We examine the effects on liquidity of different 
flotation methods. As previous literature has shown, public offerings and rights issues may 
have different effects on free float due to differences in blockholding reduction. The choice of 
flotation method is directly linked to ownership structure and to shareholder takeup. Bohren, 
Eckbo and Michalsen (1997), Cronqvist and Nilsson (2005) and Slovin, Sushka and Lai 
(2000) report that rights issues are more likely to be selected by issuers with a greater current 
shareholder takeup. Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002) find that shareholder takeup in France is 
much larger for public offerings than for rights issues. 
French firms are characterized by a high degree of ownership concentration, leading to 
limited share availability, fewer investors, and low trading frequency. In a closely held firm, 
the amount of information available is limited and blockholders are more likely to trade on 
their private information. For these reasons we expect liquidity to decrease with 





France report a positive relationship between spreads and block ownership. However, results 
for the U.S. where blockholders are mainly institutional investors are mixed. Since 
institutions prefer more liquid stocks, empirical investigations need to take into account 
endogeneity between liquidity and institutional holdings. For example, Rubin (2007) reports 
that liquidity is positively related to total institutional holdings but negatively related to 
institutional blockholdings since these investors are more likely to have private information. 
Blockholdings in France are mainly insider blocks (management, families). Therefore, 
we expect liquidity to improve with the reduction in the relative size of these blocks. For a 
sample of Nasdaq issuing firms, Kothare (1997) finds that bid-ask spreads decrease after 
public offerings as ownership becomes more diffuse, whereas they increase after rights issues 
since the latter lead to more concentrated ownership. However, her results relate to the special 
characteristics of US rights issuers, given that rights issues are rare in the U.S., especially 
outside of the utility sector. Kothare’s (1997) Table 1 shows that the average stock price of 
rights issuers is particularly low (near $5 to compare to a $19.54 average offer price for SEOs 
on Nasdaq firms in Corwin, 2003). The minimum tick size and the fact that the new shares are 
sold at a discount may partly explain Kothare’s results. Further, a considerable proportion of 
U.S. rights issuers are in financial distress. Ursel (2006) reports that at least 28% of sample 
rights firms have declared bankruptcy within the sample period. Therefore, the fraction of the 
issue subscribed to by outside investors is limited, resulting in an increase in initial 
blockholdings. 
In contrast, in France, current shareholders have to choose between public offerings 
and rights offerings. In a public offering, current shareholders may buy the new shares, 
especially if they are given a priority to subscribe, but frequently a large proportion of the 
offer is subscribed to by outside investors – mainly institutional investors. Therefore, these 
offerings are characterized by a reduction in current insider blockholdings. In a rights 
offering, shareholders may use their rights to subscribe to new shares or renounce 
subscription and sell their rights. Current blockholders indicate in the registration statement 
whether they intend to subscribe or renounce their share allocation. Therefore, the post issue 
ownership structure will remain unchanged, if all current shareholders subscribe to their 
allocation, or become more dispersed with an increase in the number of shareholders, either 
individual or institutional. 
Our hypothesis is that public offerings lead to a stronger improvement in post-SEO 





measure the reduction in current blockholdings by the sum of previous free float and the 
proportion of the new issue that is offered to outside investors scaled by the market value of 
the firm.  
 
Liquidity is an important determinant of the choice of a flotation method 
 
The choice of a flotation method depends on the characteristics of the firm. Eckbo and 
Masulis (1992) argue that the main driver of the flotation method choice is the shareholder 
takeup, k. While Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that firms issue new equity as long as the net 
present value of the investment undertaken is higher than the expected wealth transfer to 
outside investors, Eckbo and Masulis (1992) add direct costs to the wealth transfer costs. 
When current shareholders subscribe to the entire offering, managers choose the lowest direct 
costs method, uninsured rights, but as k decreases, the wealth transfer cost increases, 
eventually making it optimal to add quality certification through a standby offering, despite 
higher direct costs. As k approaches zero, firms prefer public offerings. Bohren, Eckbo and 
Michalsen (1997) for Norway, and Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002) for France provide 
evidence supporting these predictions.  
We introduce liquidity as another important determinant of the flotation method in a 
Myers and Majluf setting. First, as underlined previously, liquidity is a determinant of direct 
flotation costs. A low liquidity firm choosing a public offering will incur large costs, because 
market making is costly for underwriters. For low liquidity firms, the differential in direct 
costs between public offerings and rights issues may be large, which will induce a preference 
for rights issues, even for low shareholder takeup. If firms only had access to the public 
offering method, in the presence of high expected flotation costs, managers might prefer to 
avoid the issue.  
 
Endogeneity, costs and liquidity 
 
Finally, if firms choose the flotation method that leads to the lowest costs for them, 
flotation method choice variables may not be exogenous, as most previous literature on SEO 
flotation costs assumes. Thus, we will estimate the link between flotation costs and post SEO 
liquidity improvement taking into account the endogeneity of the issuing firm’s choices 








Summary of our predictions 
 
We expect direct flotation costs to decrease with ex ante liquidity for public offerings. 
We expect liquidity to increase after a SEO, more so after a public offering than after a 
rights issue.  
We expect liquidity to be a determinant of the choice of a flotation method. 
 
 
3.  Data  
 
3.1.  Sample selection 
 
Our initial sample consists of the universe of 274 seasoned equity offerings listed in the 
annual reports of the AMF
4over the period 1995-2006. Our sample period starts in 1995 
because intraday data to calculate bid-ask spreads are not available prior to 1995. The final 
sample excludes all issues that do not meet the following criteria: 
-  Issues that involve more than a single type of security (thus units of common stock 
and warrant offerings are excluded); 
-  Issues that do not have 30 returns available over the period (-180,-30) prior to the 
announcement date. 
  These selection criteria leave us with a sample of 178 offerings, described in Table 1. This 
sample includes 61 uninsured rights issues, 71 standby rights issues and 46 public offerings. 
Our sample of rights offerings (132) is larger than the U.S. sample in Ursel (2006), which 
contains 42 rights offerings over a 17 year period or Heron and Lie (2004), which contains 56 
rights issues over a 19 year period. 
 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
 
3.2.  Liquidity measures 
 
Data are obtained from the Euronext intraday database over the period January 1995 to 
December 2006. These data include transaction prices, trading volume, and the best limits of 
the order book (bid and ask prices and depths), as well as market capitalization. All data are 
stamped to the nearest second.  
Several different proxies are used to measure liquidity along its various dimensions. Three 
of the seven measures that we use are based on the bid-ask spread. The first measure is the 





divided by the bid-ask midpoint, which captures the cost of immediacy. Since all trades are 
not completed at the best price limits, we complement this measure with the effective spread 
using Roll’s (1984) estimator. We compute the effective spread as  ) , cov( 1 2 − ∆ ∆ − t t p p where 
t p ∆ denotes the first difference in log opening prices. A third measure uses the estimate 
proposed by Lesmond et al. (1999). One advantage of their approach is that it allows us to 
compute a general estimate of transaction costs, including, but not restricted to, the bid-ask 
spread. 
Following Chordia, Subrahmanyam and Anshuman (2001), we also use trading volume 
(in euros) since trading volume captures the ease with which investors can turn around their 
position. We also employ the turnover rate (traded volume in euros / market capitalization), 
which measures the average investors’ holding period. Constantinides (1986) proves 
theoretically that investors react to higher trading costs by reducing the frequency and volume 
of their trades, which results in lower turnover. Thus, turnover allows us to capture average 
trading costs over the cross-section of trade sizes whereas quoted bid-ask spread measures the 
cost of a round-trip small size transaction. Finally, we include price impact measures. More 
specifically, we use the Amihud illiquidity ratio which is defined as the ratio of absolute 
return to volume. The intuition for this measure is that liquid securities can accommodate 
large trading volumes with small price concessions. Since the Amihud ratio often exhibits 
extreme values, we also use a rescaled version suggested by Hasbrouck (2005), which is 
defined as the average of the square root of daily ratios.  
 
 
3.3.  SEOs characteristics 
 
We hand collect most data from the registration statements filed with the AMF.
5 Each 
filing covers the proceeds from the offer, the subscription price, the number of current shares, 
the underwriters' name, the firm’s ownership structure, and flotation costs as estimated by the 
company. The announcement dates are checked with Lexis-Nexis. Accounting data are 
collected from Thomson Financial. 
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics categorized according to flotation method.  
 






Panel A presents statistics for the issuing firms’ general and governance 
characteristics. Firms that use standby rights issuance tend to be the largest in terms of market 
value of equity whereas firms that use public offerings are the smallest in terms of the mean 
(but uninsured rights are the smallest in terms of the median).
6 The average Debt/assets ratio 
is equal to 30.53% and does not differ significantly by offering type. In contrast, for the U.S., 
Ursel (2006) reports an average debt/equity ratio of sample rights firms almost twice as large 
as for non-rights firms. Median market-to-book ratios are larger for public offers compared to 
rights issues.  
The average percentage of shares held by the main shareholder is lower for standby 
rights offerings compared to alternative flotation methods (33.50% versus 47.08% for 
uninsured rights, 44.30% for public offerings). The average percentage of shares held by all 
blockholders (holding more than 5% of the shares) lies between 47.05% for standby rights 
issues and 66.77% for uninsured rights offerings. At the 20% threshold, firms are controlled 
by a family (33%), another corporation (25%), a financial institution (15%) and 25% are 
widely held. 
Table 2, Panel B describes offering characteristics. The three types of offerings differ 
in various ways. The mean (median) number of shares in a public offering scaled by the total 
number of outstanding shares after the issue is 16.60% (14.25%). This ratio is highest for 
uninsured rights (mean 31.61%, median 26.10%). The subscription price offers a mean 
(median) discount from the stock market price of 14.85% (13.85%).  The mean discount for 
public offerings is 4.12%. The discount for standby rights (21.37%) exceeds the discount to 
uninsured rights (15.35%). It should be noted that public offerings and rights issues discounts 
are not comparable since rights discounts are to current shareholders. In public offerings, 
shares are mainly offered to raise funds for new investments, while 59.02% of uninsured 
rights and 39.44% of standby rights proceeds are used to repay debt.  
For 72% of sample offerings, there are subscription precommitments from 
blockholders, on average, to subscribe 34.71% of the offering. Public offerings significantly 
differ from other flotation methods as 82.19% of the gross proceeds are offered to outside 
investors, reflecting low blockholder takeup. For uninsured rights, blockholder 
precommitments are at 52.32%. The mean (median) expected reduction in blockholdings 
equals 4.04% (2.20%) for the total sample. The largest reduction is observed for public 





For each sample firm, we compute the abnormal stock runup over the (-180,-2) period before 
the SEO announcement date. The mean (median) long term stock runup is 14.14% (8.45%). 
We find a small mean runup prior to an uninsured rights offer announcement (1.75%), a 
positive runup prior to standby rights issues (17.78%), and a larger positive runup prior to a 
public offer announcement (24.97%). This evidence supports Eckbo and Masulis (1992) 
prediction that there should be a limited runup before an offering with large blockholders 
precommitments, which are generally observed in uninsured rights issues. 
 
 
4.  Empirical results 
 




We measure costs of SEOs as flotation costs and abnormal returns at SEO 
announcements (Table 3, Panel A). Public offerings are more expensive than rights offerings. 
The average cost of offerings as a percent of total issue proceeds is 4.08% for public 
offerings, 3% for standby rights and 2.55% for uninsured rights issues, confirming the low-
cost status of the latter flotation method.
7  
The abnormal stock returns at SEO announcement are computed as the cumulative 
abnormal return for the day preceding and the day of the announcement (days -1 and 0 in 
event time). The estimation of the market model coefficients is obtained for the period 
ranging from -180 to -30 trading days prior the offering announcement. The mean 
announcement returns are insignificantly negative for uninsured rights offerings (-0.76%) and 
significantly negative for public offerings (-2.01%). We find a market reaction to standby 
rights offering close to zero.  
We next examine whether liquidity improvement could favor public offerings. We 
first present univariate estimates of liquidity measures before SEOs and abnormal liquidity 
measures around SEOs (Table 3, panel B). We measure abnormal liquidity as the difference 
between the post SEO liquidity measures (period 30 to 180, where 0 is the end of the 
subscription period) and the normal liquidity calculated over the pre-estimation period, -180,-
30. We choose to exclude the immediate post SEO period to avoid short term effects due to 
market making. As Aktinkilic (2001) underlines, underwriters provide market making during 
the offer period and the following weeks. Typically in French underwritten contracts, market 





period begins 30 days after the end of the subscription period, and therefore does not reflect 
market making activity. 
 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
  First, we observe striking differences in ex ante liquidity according to the flotation 
method. Firms using standby rights are the most liquid, whatever measure we use. They have 
the largest volume, turnover, and Amihud/Amivest liquidity measures. The average bid-ask 
spread is 1.36%, compared to 2.36% for public offerings and 3.64% for uninsured rights. 
Overall, the most liquid firms choose standby rights, and the less liquid ones choose 
uninsured rights. The firms in-between choose public offerings. 
  Second, SEOs enhance liquidity. For the total sample, we observe an increase in 
volume and a decrease in bid-ask spreads, Amihud illiquidity measures, transaction cost 
estimates (LOT) and the Roll effective spread. The increase in volume is especially important 
and significant for rights issues, whether underwritten or not, whereas the average bid-ask 
spread is significantly smaller for public offerings. The median spread also decreases for 
rights issues.  
Our univariate results confirm the findings in the previous literature as to the hierarchy of 
our three flotation methods as far as flotation costs and announcement market reaction. The 
results also establish that liquidity improves after SEOs, especially after public offerings. 
However, they do not account for the heterogeneity in the issue proceeds, the risk 
characteristics and the reduction in blockholdings. In the next subsections, we control for 
these factors in a multivariate setting. 
 
 
4.2.  Multivariate analysis of flotation costs, abnormal returns and liquidity effects 
 
We control for size, risk, ownership structure and test whether flotation methods have 
an effect on direct flotation costs, abnormal return, and liquidity changes when controlling for 
issue characteristics. We include year dummies to control for the evolution of costs over time. 
Table 4 reports the estimation results from the following regressions. 
Flotation costsi = α + β0 VOLATi + β1Gross proceeds i + β2 pre-SEO liquidity + β3 takeupi + β4 
standby rightsi + β5 public offerings + standby rights*pre-SEO liquidity + public offerings* pre-SEO 







Abnormal returni = α + β0 VOLATi + β1Gross proceeds i + β2 pre-SEO liquidity + β3 takeupi + β4 




Abnormal liquidityi = α + β0 VOLATi + β1Gross proceeds i + β2 pre-SEO liquidity + β3 free float 




[Insert Table 4] 
 
Results in Table 4, Panel A confirm that, when controlling for size, volatility, 
blockholder takeup, and pre-offering liquidity, direct flotation costs are larger for public 
offerings and standby rights compared to uninsured rights, but we do not find any difference 
between standby rights and public offerings costs (as the Wald test of the difference in the 
coefficients of the standby rights and public offerings method dummies coefficients indicates 
at the end of Table 4). Flotation costs increase with volatility, and decrease with size and 
blockholder takeup. The pre-SEO liquidity decreases flotation costs, but the significance of 
the coefficient depends on the measure of liquidity introduced in the model.  
We further examine the effect of liquidity on direct costs by introducing an interactive 
variable for flotation methods and pre-SEO liquidity. We find that flotation costs increase 
with spreads for public offerings, whereas the cost disadvantage of standby rights decreases as 
liquidity worsens, whatever measure for liquidity is used. The first result confirms Butler et al 
(2005) results. When investment banks face costs of market making or maintaining a net 
position in the stock, these costs are lower for more liquid firms. Uninsured rights typically do 
not benefit from market making activities, and we observe that direct flotation costs for these 
offerings do not depend on liquidity. Finally, in standby rights, even if underwriters are in 
charge of the placement of the shares, market liquidity is less important for them.  In the case 
where current shareholders take up all their rights, there are no transaction costs, and liquidity 
does not matter. Further, the large discount inherent to rights issues reduces the market 
making activity of the underwriter. 
The market reaction to SEO announcement becomes less favorable as the size of the 
issue increases, and is more positive when the issue is intended to finance an acquisition, 
confirming previous findings (Table 4, Panel B). Ex ante liquidity has no effect on the 





reaction than uninsured rights. Public offerings have a market reaction that does not differ 
from that for uninsured rights, but is significantly lower than the reaction to standby rights, as 
the Wald test at the end of the Table 4B shows. 
We next turn to post-SEO liquidity analysis (Table 4, Panel C). Abnormal Liquidityi is 
the dependent variable represented by the abnormal relative spread, Amihud illiquidity ratio, 
rescaled Amihud ratio, transaction cost estimate (LOT), Roll’s spread, for the SEOi. The size 
of the offering, which is directly linked to the size of the firm, reduces spreads. Larger firms 
enjoy more analyst coverage, greater disclosure activity, and therefore reduced information 
asymmetry. Liquidity improves more for firms that are less liquid in the pre-event period. The 
impact of an increase in market value of the firm and of its free float is more important for 
low liquidity firms, whatever the measure for liquidity. The dilution of blockholders does not 
impact the change in liquidity. We find that both public offerings and standby rights lead to 
improved post-SEO spreads and rescaled Amihud ratio, compared to uninsured rights, 
whereas the Amihud illiquidity measure is lower for standby rights compared to uninsured 
rights.  
 
4.3.  Liquidity as a determinant of the flotation method 
 
We estimate a multinomial logit of probability of a firm choosing either standby rights 
or public offerings over uninsured rights. The estimates are reported in Table 5.  
 
 [Insert Table 5] 
 
Three variables explain the flotation method choice: the percentage of capital held by 
blockholders, a dummy equal to one when blockholders renounce subscribing the new 
shares
8, and ex ante liquidity. Firms with large blockholders choose between public offerings 
and uninsured rights. They opt for public offerings when blockholders renounce their share 
allocation and for uninsured rights when they decide to subscribe. Low liquidity firms have a 
preference for uninsured rights. As underwriting contracts, either standby or firm 
commitment, may be too costly for them, they will choose the less expensive uninsured 
rights. Firms will therefore balance underwriter fees and blockholder decisions. Liquidity will 
be especially important for firms with a large part of the issue offered to outside investors, 
due to small initial blockholders or current blockholder renouncement of their allocation. 
However, low liquidity firms may prefer uninsured rights, even if blockholders partly 





selling their rights and the wealth transfer costs may still be lower than the fees an underwriter 




4.4.  2SLS analysis of flotation costs, abnormal returns and liquidity effects 
 
Models explaining direct costs, market reaction and liquidity effects in Table 4 are 
estimated on the implicit assumption that the flotation method choice variables are 
exogenous. However, as Table 5 shows, this is unlikely to be the case. OLS estimates for the 
coefficients of endogenous method dummies may be inconsistent. Firms that may pay the 
higher flotation costs when opting for an underwritten offering are likely to prefer uninsured 
rights. Therefore, we employ two-stage least-squares regressions to take endogeneity into 
account. The first stage is the multinomial logit estimated in Table 5. The second stage uses 
the predicted probabilities from the first stage to instrument the endogenous choice variables. 
The other explanatory variables are those used in the OLS regressions. Results are reported in 
Table 6. 
 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
Controlling for endogeneity, we find that, whatever liquidity measure is included in 
the regression, standby rights are more expensive than uninsured rights. The coefficient for 
public offerings is positive, but only weakly significantly, meaning their costs are slightly 
larger or comparable to uninsured rights costs. Comparison of the OLS estimates in Table 4 
and the 2SLS estimates in Table 6 suggests significant differences introduced by the failure to 
treat flotation method choices as endogenous. Table 4 highlights equal costs for standby rights 
and public offerings, whereas the Wald test at the end of Table 6 documents that at the 10% 
significance level, standby rights are more expensive than public offerings. Controlling for 
endogeneity, market reactions to SEO announcements no longer differ significantly according 
to the flotation method. Finally, we find that Amihud liquidity measures are improved after 
public offerings and also, but less significantly, after standby rights, compared to uninsured 
rights. Bid-ask spreads are significantly reduced for public offerings compared to standby 
rights (Wald test). Once flotation method choice is treated as endogenous, public offerings 
appear slightly less expensive and a more liquidity improving method than standby rights. 
Uninsured rights are still a good low cost choice for firms that are not seeking improved 






5.  Conclusion 
 
This paper extends the earlier tests of the rights offer paradox by including liquidity 
effects in the costs and benefits of a given flotation method. We study three major SEO offer 
methods: uninsured rights, standby rights and public offerings. Our study investigates how 
flotation costs depend on market liquidity, how market liquidity affects the flotation method 
choice, and whether liquidity improves after SEOs.  
We first document that flotation costs decrease with market liquidity for public offerings, 
but not for rights issues, and contribute to the debate on the effect of liquidity on firm value. 
Second, we find that market liquidity and blockholder renouncement to subscribe to the new 
shares are important determinants of the flotation method choice. Low liquidity firms prefer 
uninsured rights. When large blockholders decide not to subscribe to the new offering, firms 
opt for public offerings. Treating the flotation method choice as endogenous, we find that 
public offerings are less expensive and more liquidity improving than standby rights. 
Uninsured rights incur reduced flotation costs, but limited market liquidity improvement 
although it may still be the best method for firms with large blockholders subscribing to the 
new shares. Our results help to understand why firms choose public offerings despite higher 
apparent costs and therefore contribute to the resolution of the rights offer paradox. Our study 
provides insights to help issuing firms and investment bankers to better understand the costs 
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1 Several recent studies investigate the IPO aftermarket liquidity (see for example Ellul and Pagano, 2006). 
2 Using a sample of underwritten public offerings, Lee and Masulis (2008) find that firm’s information 
asymmetry, which we can view as an explanatory factor of liquidity, increases the probability of SEO 
withdrawals. They find that information asymmetry is greater for withdrawn issues than for completed SEOs. 
3 Bortolotti, Megginson and Smart (2007) document a dramatic increase in SEOs executed through accelerated 
underwritings in Europe and in the U.S. 
4 The AMF (autorité des marchés financiers) plays the same role as the SEC in the US. 
5 Thomson New Issues databases for France report only part of the SEOs. We double checked our sample with 
their data. We find that New Issues databases report one third of our sample, with several missing data and 
mistakes, but report several repurchases and bought deals classified as SEOs. 
6 The type of firms using public offerings dramatically changed over time. In Gajewski and Ginglinger (2002)’s 
study over the period 1986-1996, the largest firms chose public offerings, to have access to international markets 
and institutional investors and enlarge their float. More recently, rights offerings rebounded especially for large 
firms, guided by control motivation. For firms fearing tender offers and hostile entry in their capital, it may be 
optimal to use standby rights. 
7 For a review of evidence on flotation costs results, see Eckbo et al, 2007.  
8 Results remain qualitatively unchanged if we introduce current blockholders takeup in the model. However, 
current shareholder takeup may be low because the block they own is small or because they decide to renounce 
to subscribe to their allocation in the new issue. Our two variables, blockholders and renounce, capture this 
information. Year
Number Proceeds Number Proceeds Number Proceeds Number Proceeds
1995 1 134 1 134 - - - -
1996 9 1 146 7 1 106 1 34 1 6
1997 11 2 461 8 698 2 1 683 1 79
1998 7 1 552 4 1 176 - 0 3 375
1999 10 1 488 7 1 473 3 15 - 0
2000 33 6 636 11 5 550 7 148 15 938
2001 18 2 684 8 2 354 3 80 7 250
2002 15 3 038 4 1 033 8 1 829 3 176
2003 18 4 238 3 1 435 13 2 794 2 9
2004 17 1 285 5 1 207 9 58 3 20
2005 20 4 024 7 3 514 6 82 7 428
2006 19 20 336 6 9 728 9 9 934 4 674
Total 178 49 023 71 29 410 61 16 656 46 2 956
The sample consists of 178 share issues executed between January 1, 1995 and December 31, 2006 by 
firms listed on Euronext Paris. This table classifies the offerings by flotation method; proceeds is gross 
proceeds (Euro m); uninsured rights issues are rights offerings without bank standby underwriting; Public 
Offerings are equity issues without rights.
Table 1. Seasoned equity offerings in France from 1995 to 2006










Mean Mean Mean Mean
Median Median Median Median
Number of observations 178 71 61 46
2 779,92 4 440,80 2 535,08 541,07 0,322 0,006*** 0,149
128,77 362,31 42,88 209,27 0,000*** 0,060* 0,001***
30,53% 30,82% 31,84% 28,38% 0,807 0,486 0,437
29,30% 32,10% 29,30% 28,30% 0,668 0,278 0,669
4,44 6,69 2,23 4,09 0,305 0,492 0,346
1,74 1,75 1,47 2,73 0,075* 0,120 0,007***
40,94% 33,50% 47,08% 44,30% 0,001*** 0,020** 0,552
40,55% 27,70% 47,60% 47,80% 0,001*** 0,011** 0,725
57,11% 47,05% 66,77% 59,83% 0,000*** 0,004*** 0,085*
61,85% 44,30% 67,00% 59,85% 0,000*** 0,005*** 0,042**
0,33 0,24 0,30 0,52 0,476 0,002*** 0,019**
0,00 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,474 0,002*** 0,018**
0,25 0,15 0,43 0,17 0,001*** 0,790 0,004***
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,001*** 0,790 0,006***
0,15 0,21 0,13 0,09 0,223 0,056* 0,467
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,229 0,077* 0,479
0,25 0,39 0,13 0,20 0,000*** 0,019** 0,382
0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,001*** 0,025** 0,371
24,30% 23,02% 31,61% 16,60% 0.005*** 0.007*** 0,000***
19,55% 18,20% 26,10% 14,25% 0.001*** 0.030** 0.000***
47,30 60,76 29,17 50,56 0.025** 0,493 0.017**
24,20 27,00 13,72 35,94 0.014** 0,297 0.000***
14,85% 21,37% 15,35% 4,12% 0.010*** 0,000*** 0,000***
13,85% 20,50% 14,40% 3,85% 0.001*** 0.000*** 0.000***
275,41 414,22 273,06 64,27 0,356 0.001*** 0.084*
31,29 90,58 11,21 30,58 0.000*** 0.004*** 0.048**
28,09% 33,80% 21,31% 28,26% 0,109 0,529 0,418
0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,113 0,533 0,411
26,97% 26,76% 19,67% 36,96% 0,338 0,257 0.054*
0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,00% 0,342 0,247 0.048**
44,94% 39,44% 59,02% 34,78% 0,025 0,614 0.013**
0,00% 0,00% 100,00% 0,00% 0.026** 0,616 0.014**
72,47% 81,69% 88,52% 36,96% 0,271 0,000*** 0,000***
100,00% 100,00% 100,00% 0,00% 0,278 0.000*** 0.000***
34,71% 30,53% 52,32% 17,81% 0,000*** 0.017** 0,000***
32,00% 26,60% 54,70% 0,00% 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000***
65,29% 69,47% 47,68% 82,19% 0,000*** 0.017** 0,000***
68,00% 73,40% 45,30% 100,00% 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.000***
4,04% 2,90% 3,67% 6,30% 0,454 0.002*** 0.043**
2,20% 0,90% 1,30% 5,25% 0,961 0.000*** 0.001***
14,14% 17,78% 1,75% 24,97% 0.005*** 0.005*** 0,780
8,45% 6,60% 7,10% 17,35% 0.010** 0.010** 0,570
Abnormal runup [-180,-2]
The sample includes 178 share issues on the French Stock Exchange from 1995 to 2006. For Debt variable, we have only 162 observations. This table reports the 
mean and the median of each variable and the significance for the differences in means and medians between Standby Rights issues, Rights issues and Public 
Offerings.  In Panel A., Size is market value (Euro m); Debt is the debt on assets ratio at year end before the issue, M/B is the market to book ratio at year end 
before the issue; Main shareholder is the percentage of the shares held by the main shareholder; Blockholders is the percentage of the shares owned by the 
shareholders whose names are included in the registration statement filed with the AMF; Family control, Corporate control, Financial control are dummies equal to 
one if the firm is controlled by a family, a corporate or a financial firm respectively; Widely held firms is a dummy equal to one if the main shareholder holds less than 
20% of the shares.
In Panel B., Percentage of change in the number of shares is number of shares issued at number of shares after the issue; Discount is offer price less stock price at 
stock price;  Proceeds is gross proceeds (Euro m), Acquisition financing, investment financing and capital structure are dummies equal to 1 if the funds raised are used








Free float expected variation












Panel A. Firms’ general and governance characteristics




Panel B. Offerings’ characteristics
Financial control
Widely held firms




p value for 
mean/median 
difference







Mean Mean Mean Mean
Median Median Median Median
3,13% 3,00% 2,55% 4,08% 0,157 0.011** 0.001***
3,00% 3,00% 2,10% 3,85% 0.071* 0.015** 0.001***
-0,73% 0,09% -0,76% -2.01%*** 0,487 0,111 0,271
-1.00%** -1,15% -0.70%** -0.50%** 0,843 0,649 0,912
9 480 848 16 198 613 7 252 286 2 067 391 0,184 0.008*** 0,263
144 423 602 118 32 840 258 699 0,000*** 0.028** 0.002***
0,255 0,310 0,216 0,219 0,217 0.083* 0,969
0,134 0,234 0,097 0,123 0.000*** 0.027** 0,228
2,402 1,362 3,644 2,361 0.000*** 0.007*** 0.017**
1,813 0,950 2,928 1,813 0.000*** 0.001*** 0.002***
4,78 2,47 5,78 7,03 0,310 0,289 0,798
0,05 0,01 0,53 0,04 0.000*** 0.003*** 0.006***
138,95 83,35 197,12 147,63 0.001*** 0,153 0,320
52,00 22,21 138,96 48,53 0.000*** 0.006*** 0.005***
0,020 0,010 0,036 0,015 0.039** 0.090* 0,100
0,010 0,006 0,016 0,009 0.000*** 0.027** 0.008***
0,044 0,034 0,055 0,046 0.000*** 0.006*** 0,137
0,038 0,027 0,045 0,040 0.000*** 0.003*** 0,275
3 121 058*** 6 287 580** 1 274 094 452 757 0.073* 0.026** 0,469
22 683*** 128 941*** 9 989*** 7 986 0.020** 0.018** 0,724
0,037 0,120 -0,224 0,228 0,485 0,745 0,340
-0,003 0,167 -0,061 0,001 0,254 0,911 0,144
-0.230** -0,109 -0,264 -0.367* 0,627 0,210 0,754
-0.121*** -0.045* -0.318* -0.196*** 0,222 0.079* 0,814
-7,505 -12,683 13,301 -24,882 0,546 0,599 0,377
-0.022*** -0.002*** -0,136 -0.059** 0,239 0,196 0,873
-0,183 -0,177 -0,106 -0.287** 0,856 0,519 0,637
-0.036*** -0.015*** -0,130 -0.084*** 0,314 0,329 0,890
-0,157 -0,111 -0,238 -0,133 0,608 0,928 0,731
-0.090* -0,051 -0,093 -0.145*** 0,571 0,519 0,930
-0.487** -0,110 -1.097*** -0,343 0.017** 0,672 0,196
-0.426*** -0,169 -0.890*** -0.528*** 0.005*** 0.041** 0,425






Long-term Post subscription period - Abnormal liquidity measures
Abnormal volume
Panel A. Flotation costs and abnormal returns
CAR [-1,0] announcement 
Panel B. Liquidity measures 
This table summarizes univariate results of flotation costs, abnormal returns and liquidity statistics. 
In Panel A., Cost is the sum of the banking fees and the legal and administrative fees; CAR [-1,0] are abnormal stock returns computed at the announcement date (days -1 
and 0 in event time). 
In Panel B, liquidity statistics are given for the estimation period [-180,-30] where date 0 is the announcement date and abnormal liquidity measures are given for the post-
subscription period [+30,+180] where date 0 corresponds to the subscription period expiration date. Abnormal liquidity measures are estimated as the difference between 
observed liquidity over post subscription period and its average value over the estimation period; Volume is the daily number of shares traded multiplied by the average 
daily trading price; Turnover is  the ratio of the euro trading volume divided by the market value; Spread is the difference between the ask and bid prices divided by the 
spread midpoint; Amihud illiquidity ratio is 1/NΣ(|Rt|/|VOL€t|) where N is the number of non-zero trading volume days;  |Rt| is the absolute return on date t and VOL€t is the 
euro trading volume on day t; Rescaled Amihud illiquidity ratio is the average of the square root of daily Amihud ratios; LOT is Lesmond et al. (1999) estimate of transaction c
 *,**,*** represent the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.

















Table 3. Univariate results around seasoned equity offerings
















Cost/gross proceedsTable 4. Multivariate analysis of flotation costs, abnormal returns and liquidity effects 
Model 2
Amihud  illiquidity 






as pre SEO 
liquidity
Model 4 
LOT as pre 
SEO liquidity
Model 5
Roll as pre 
SEO liquidity
Model 1 
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Model 4 
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SEO liquidity
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Constant 0,0390 0,0475 0,0434 0,0474 0,0480 0,0456 Constant -0,0060 0,0020 0,0013 -0,0031 -0,0096 Constant 0,0200 0,0001 0,0011 -0,0021 0,0210
[3.417]*** [4.13]*** [4.329]*** [4.102]*** [4.46]*** [4.471]*** [-0,126] [0.046] [0.028] [-0.07] [-0.217] [1,985]** [1.4] [0.972] [-0.26] [1.548]
1997 0,0083 0,0090 0,0077 0,0056 0,0095 0,0103 1997 0,0312 0,0308 0,0307 0,0313 0,0310 1997 0,0010 0,0000 0,0001 0,0057 0,0043
[1.24] [1.364] [1.187] [0.836] [1.39] [1.577] [1,12] [1.107] [1.09] [1.124] [1.113] [0,177] [-0.661] [0.206] [1.115] [0.499]
1998 0,0099 0,0068 0,0107 0,0061 0,0103 0,0120 1998 0,0256 0,0263 0,0262 0,0264 0,0253 1998 0,0030 0,0000 0,0005 0,0177 0,0384
[1.269] [0.892] [1.452] [0.794] [1.325] [1.602] [0,76] [0.792] [0.786] [0.793] [0.762] [0,449] [-0.236] [0.62] [2.983]*** [3.837]***
1999 0,0152 0,0138 0,0143 0,0110 0,0147 0,0168 1999 0,0652 0,0651 0,0647 0,0655 0,0655 1999 0,0036 0,0000 0,0001 0,0088 0,0139
[2.198]** [2.044]** [2.149]** [1.568] [2.094]** [2.516]** [2,277]** [2.277]** [2.24]** [2.285]** [2.293]** [0,584] [-0.631] [0.206] [1.613] [1.521]
2000 0,0090 0,0099 0,0101 0,0072 0,0098 0,0107 2000 0,0668 0,0668 0,0668 0,0672 0,0653 2000 0,0042 0,0000 0,0003 0,0083 0,0119
[1.534] [1.733]* [1.805]* [1.234] [1.668]* [1.897]* [2,732]*** [2.753]*** [2.723]*** [2.749]*** [2.681]*** [0,833] [-0.209] [0.5] [1.836]* [1.57]
2001 0,0118 0,0132 0,0126 0,0102 0,0125 0,0154 2001 0,0470 0,0468 0,0469 0,0474 0,0468 2001 0,0059 0,0000 0,0007 0,0153 0,0284
[1.896]* [2.176]** [2.122]** [1.641] [1.977]** [2.554]** [1,789]* [1.792]* [1.783]* [1.816]* [1.794]* [1,111] [-0.219] [1.131] [3.211]*** [3.559]***
2002 0,0144 0,0151 0,0148 0,0120 0,0150 0,0194 2002 0,0659 0,0663 0,0661 0,0665 0,0663 2002 0,0116 -0,0001 0,0003 0,0140 0,0117
[2.197]** [2.36]** [2.367]** [1.843]* [2.262]** [3.04]*** [2,421]** [2.459]** [2.437]** [2.463]** [2.458]** [2,048]** [-0.913] [0.474] [2.788]*** [1.382]
2003 0,0185 0,0181 0,0151 0,0139 0,0199 0,0217 2003 0,0678 0,0731 0,0692 0,0686 0,0692 2003 -0,0093 -0,0001 -0,0008 -0,0028 -0,0032
[2.848]*** [2.857]*** [2.38]** [2.163]** [3.098]*** [3.512]*** [2,503]** [2.636]*** [2.558]** [2.566]** [2.594]** [-1,662]* [-0.937] [-1.282] [-0.569] [-0.388]
2004 0,0157 0,0144 0,0124 0,0096 0,0155 0,0179 2004 0,0662 0,0682 0,0668 0,0666 0,0669 2004 -0,0001 0,0000 0,0000 0,0077 0,0074
[2.476]** [2.341]** [2.026]** [1.491] [2.419]** [2.921]*** [2,492]** [2.56]** [2.514]** [2.51]** [2.528]** [-0,025] [-0.01] [-0.038] [1.572] [0.91]
2005 0,0155 0,0160 0,0151 0,0127 0,0158 0,0192 2005 0,0728 0,0727 0,0723 0,0730 0,0724 2005 -0,0037 -0,0001 -0,0002 0,0054 0,0025
[2.489]** [2.629]*** [2.525]** [2.025]** [2.5]** [3.154]*** [2,789]*** [2.788]*** [2.741]*** [2.795]*** [2.78]*** [-0,688] [-0.929] [-0.288] [1.138] [0.313]
2006 0,0166 0,0169 0,0164 0,0139 0,0177 0,0188 2006 0,0549 0,0562 0,0554 0,0555 0,0542 2006 -0,0011 0,0000 0,0000 0,0014 0,0017
[2.584]** [2.687]*** [2.673]*** [2.19]** [2.749]*** [3.032]*** [2,027]** [2.095]** [2.062]** [2.068]** [2.017]** [-0,189] [-0.761] [-0.034] [0.27] [0.196]
Takeup -0,0288 -0,0264 -0,0277 -0,0275 -0,0272 -0,0269 Takeup 0,0159 0,0173 0,0170 0,0164 0,0139 Volatility 0,0039 0,0000 0,0005 0,0017 0,0006
[-6.327]*** [-5.833]*** [-6.33]*** [-6.212]*** [-5.895]*** [-6.125]*** [0,822] [0.911] [0.888] [0.856] [0.72] [1,172] [0.463] [1.231] [0.549] [0.041]
Volatility 0,0174 0,0175 0,0164 0,0167 0,0184 0,0108 Volatility 0,0112 0,0118 0,0112 0,0114 -0,0045 Pre SEO Liquidity -0,3735 -0,6837 -0,3635 -0,2335 -0,5506
[4.474]*** [4.584]*** [4.358]*** [4.418]*** [4.616]*** [1.643] [0,679] [0.71] [0.679] [0.686] [-0.172] [-5,492]*** [-11.429]*** [-5.172]*** [-3.909]*** [-2.891]***
Pre-SEO Liquidity 0,0828 0,0363 18,9657 1,0805 0,0026 0,0367 Pre SEO liquidity 0,0460 -16,5590 -0,4894 0,0088 0,2502 Proceeds -0,0013 0,0000 -0,0001 -0,0001 -0,0011
[1.366] [0.558] [2.073]** [1.132] [0.12] [0.499] [0,181] [-0.607] [-0.167] [0.099] [0.786] [-1,675]* [-0.653] [-0.761] [-0.206] [-1.06]
Proceeds -0,0028 -0,0036 -0,0029 -0,0032 -0,0036 -0,0033 Proceeds -0,0092 -0,0100 -0,0097 -0,0094 -0,0089 Free float variation 0,0063 0,0000 -0,0007 -0,0077 0,0338
[-3.433]*** [-4.118]*** [-4.119]*** [-3.993]*** [-4.662]*** [-4.597]*** [-2,681]*** [-3.166]*** [-2.797]*** [-3.072]*** [-2.847]*** [0,337] [0.042] [-0.34] [-0.469] [1.216]
Public Offerings 0,0098 0,0045 0,0068 0,0067 0,0080 -0,0073 acquisition 0,0490 0,0490 0,0488 0,0488 0,0494 Public Offerings -0,0071 0,0000 -0,0007 -0,0036 -0,0028
[2.743]*** [0.922] [1.859]* [1.619] [1.833]* [-1.146] [4,099]*** [4.129]*** [4.105]*** [4.097]*** [4.158]*** [-2,388]** [-1.369] [-1.936]* [-1.354] [-0.634]
Standby rights 0,0102 0,0162 0,0091 0,0125 0,0131 0,0132 Public Offerings -0,0054 -0,0039 -0,0053 -0,0054 -0,0039 Standby rights  -0,0055 -0,0001 -0,0006 -0,0032 -0,0030
[3.072]*** [3.4]*** [2.725]*** [3.302]*** [3.08]*** [2.461]** [-0,359] [-0.256] [-0.352] [-0.361] [-0.261] [-1,947]* [-1.77]* [-1.892]* [-1.271] [-0.7]
Public Offerings*Pre SEO liquidity 0,2327 12,8957 1,5244 0,1031 0,3819 Standby rights  0,0325 0,0335 0,0324 0,0323 0,0335
[1.931]* [1.059] [1.28] [0.754] [3.233]*** [2,337]** [2.402]** [2.339]** [2.329]** [2.416]**
Standby rights*Pre SEO liquidity -0,3961 -30,9239 -3,5564 -0,2830 -0,1038
[-2.174]** [-1.921]* [-2.377]** [-1.434] [-0.975]
Adjusted R² 44,87% 47,65% 49,30% 48,40% 44,58% 48,57% Adjusted R² 12,82% 13,02% 12,82% 12,81% 13,16% Adjusted R² 23,65% 49,04% 22,22% 22,21% 39,88%
Wald test public/standby 0,015 6,263 0,534 2,739 1,374 11,217 Wald test public/st 7,91 7,72 7,80 7,87 7,76 Wald test public/stan 0,313 0,104 0,022 0,024 0,001
p value Wald 0,903 0.013** 0,466 0.10* 0,243 0.001*** pvalue Wald 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 0.006*** p value Wald 0,577 0,747 0,882 0,877 0,978
The table reports OLS regressions results. In Panel A, the dependent variable is flotation costs on gross proceeds; In Panel B, the dependent variable is CAR [-1,0] at the announcement date and in Panel C, dependent variables are abnormal liquidity measures such as abnormal spread (model 1), abnormal 
amihud illiquidity ratio (model 2), rescaled abnormal amihud illiquidity ratio (model 3), abnormal LOT (model 4)  and abnormal Roll (model 5). Those measures were estimated as the difference between observed liquidity after the subscription [+30,+180] period and its average value over the estimation period 
(Pre SEO liquidity). The  explanatory variables are year dummies, takeup defined as the  % of the issue taken up by blockholders, volatility computed over the [-10,-5] period before the subscription period, Pre SEO liquidity measures, proceeds defined as log of gross proceeds (in million  €),  acquisition dummy 
(equals to 1 if the funds raised are used to finance a specific acquisition),free float expected variation, Public offerings and Standby rights issues dummies and interaction variables between these dummies and pre SEO liquidity. Pre SEO liquidity measures include spread (model 1) defined as the difference 
between the ask and bid prices divided by the spread midpoint; Amihud illiquidity ratio (model 2) estimated as 1/NΣ(|Rt|/|VOL €t|) where N is the number of non-zero trading volume days;  |Rt| is the absolute return on date t and VOL€t is the euro trading volume on day t; rescaled Amihud illiquidity ratio (model 3) ca
t. statistics are in brackets;  *,**,*** represent the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
Panel A. OLS analysis of flotation costs Panel B. OLS analysis of abnormal returns  Panel C. OLS analysis of abnormal liquidity 
Model 1
Spread as pre SEO 











Constant 3,7193 2,0968 0,1308 0,9248 0,1791 0,7736 1,0660 1,7182 2,0940 2,3025
[1.923]* [0.977] [0.089] [0.471] [0.119] [0.386] [0.672] [0.83] [1.184] [1.025]
Change in shares -0,3102 -7,6196 -2,2194 -7,8485 -2,1913 -8,0002 -1,5697 -7,5049 -1,3599 -7,2731
[-0.217] [-3.130]*** [-1.85]* [-3.36]*** [-1.815]* [-3.381]*** [-1.224] [-3.176]*** [-1.044] [-3.112]***
Pre seo liquidity -56,0901 -4,6221 -200,7124 846,8483 -22,8174 88,3167 -21,2967 -5,6385 -18,8289 -8,3092
[-2.675]*** [-0.366] [-280668.982]*** [618301.601]*** [-0.354] [1.42] [-1.578] [-0.447] [-1.949]* [-0.789]
Proceeds -0,0466 -0,1516 0,2629 -0,0468 0,2594 -0,0266 0,1783 -0,1143 0,1372 -0,1406
[-0.311] [-0.923] [2.334]** [-0.318] [2.223]** [-0.176] [1.462] [-0.73] [1.085] [-0.879]
Renounc. -0,3775 2,3450 -0,5299 2,3387 -0,5275 2,3252 -0,4314 2,3274 -0,3552 2,3535
[-0.618] [4.151]*** [-0.865] [4.169]*** [-0.862] [4.13]*** [-0.708] [4.12]*** [-0.578] [4.148]***
Blockholders -2,9891 0,2930 -3,5517 0,2530 -3,5474 0,0709 -3,3796 0,2401 -3,7394 0,0569
[-2.789]*** [0.243] [-3.503]*** [0.21] [-3.485]*** [0.059] [-3.273]*** [0.2] [-3.581]*** [0.047]
Pseudo-R²
LR test (Chi2)
This table estimates a multinomial logit of the probability of a firm choosing any of alternative issues (Public Offerings,standby rights offerings) rather than a rights issue. The explanatory variables are % of change
in the number of shares defined as the number of shares issued at number of shares after the issue; Pre SEO liquidity measures; proceeds defined as log of gross proceeds (in million €); Renounce (take up 
renouncement) : dummy equal to 1 if 100% of the issue is offered to external investors; Blockholders defined as the % of the shares owned by blockholders. Pre SEO liquidity measures include spread (model 1) 
defined as the difference between the ask and bid prices divided by the spread midpoint; Amihud illiquidity ratio (model 2) estimated as 1/NΣ(|Rt|/|VOL€t|) where N is the number of non-zero trading volume days;  
|Rt| the absolute return on date t and VOL€t the euro trading volume on day t; rescaled Amihud illiquidity ratio (model 3) calculated as the average of the square root of daily Amihud ratios; LOT (model 4) which is 
Lesmond et al. (1999) estimate of transaction costs ; Roll (model 5) which is Roll (1984) estimate of effective spread. 
 t. statistics are in brackets. *,**,*** represent the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.
106.14*** 97.7*** 96.7*** 99.04*** 100.25***
Model 6
Roll as pre SEO liquidity measure
27,52% 25,33% 25,07% 25,68% 25,99%
Model 1 
Spread as pre SEO liquidity measure
Model 2
Amihud illiquidity ratio as pre SEO 
liquidity measure
Model 3
Rescaled amihud ratio as pre SEO 
liquidity measure
Model 5
LOT as pre SEO liquidity measureTable 6. 2SLS analysis of flotation costs, abnormal returns and liquidity effects 
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Constant 0,0003 0,0187 0,0148 0,0221 0,0044 Constant -0,1358 -0,0886 -0,0767 -0,1073 -0,1207 Constant 0,0253 0,0002 0,0018 0,0015 0,0178
[0.009] [0.936] [0.724] [1.066] [0.135] [-1,083] [-1.204] [-1.128] [-1.302] [-1.247] [2,243]** [1.578] [1.174] [0.168] [1.376]
1997 0,0113 0,0116 0,0122 0,0112 0,0119 1997 0,0366 0,0357 0,0328 0,0369 0,0354 1997 0,0009 -0,0001 0,0000 0,0056 0,0058
[1.496] [1.668]* [1.627] [1.786]* [1.38] [1,4] [1.388] [1.342] [1.517] [1.426] [0,249] [-0.914] [-0.017] [1.035] [0.863]
1998 0,0152 0,0188 0,0193 0,0178 0,0191 1998 0,0257 0,0327 0,0296 0,0300 0,0267 1998 0,0056 0,0000 0,0006 0,0193 0,0420
[1.74]* [2.191]** [2.214]** [2.293]** [1.985]** [0,96] [1.151] [1.068] [1.119] [1.02] [1,553] [-0.054] [0.995] [2.704]*** [1.833]*
1999 0,0241 0,0236 0,0248 0,0226 0,0266 1999 0,0919 0,0907 0,0859 0,0905 0,0906 1999 0,0027 -0,0001 -0,0001 0,0079 0,0151
[2.355]** [2.523]** [2.66]*** [2.63]*** [2.283]** [2,445]** [2.869]*** [2.956]*** [2.868]*** [2.744]*** [0,827] [-1.073] [-0.185] [1.751]* [1.727]*
2000 0,0181 0,0205 0,0214 0,0182 0,0207 2000 0,0755 0,0791 0,0747 0,0738 0,0707 2000 0,0067 0,0000 0,0004 0,0102 0,0170
[2.093]** [2.472]** [2.602]*** [2.481]** [2.131]** [2,269]** [2.701]*** [2.767]*** [2.638]*** [2.45]** [2,018]** [-0.009] [0.604] [1.872]* [2.178]**
2001 0,0209 0,0226 0,0234 0,0211 0,0241 2001 0,0629 0,0652 0,0612 0,0628 0,0608 2001 0,0076 0,0000 0,0007 0,0164 0,0325
[2.186]** [2.477]** [2.534]** [2.527]** [2.192]** [1,719]* [2.041]** [2.04]** [2.036]** [1.881]* [1,498] [-0.164] [0.994] [2.998]*** [3.183]***
2002 0,0321 0,0330 0,0344 0,0309 0,0379 2002 0,1047 0,1083 0,1017 0,1036 0,1024 2002 0,0113 -0,0001 -0,0003 0,0136 0,0182
[2.334]** [2.494]** [2.698]*** [2.68]*** [2.225]** [1,576] [2.222]** [2.214]** [2.131]** [1.89]* [1,646]* [-1.403] [-0.337] [2.321]** [2.166]**
2003 0,0408 0,0398 0,0424 0,0390 0,0490 2003 0,1214 0,1420 0,1245 0,1195 0,1213 2003 -0,0106 -0,0001 -0,0017 -0,0039 0,0039
[2.341]** [2.278]** [2.645]*** [2.838]*** [2.303]** [1,648]* [2.195]** [2.337]** [2.165]** [1.998]** [-1,538] [-1.516] [-1.574] [-0.609] [0.45]
2004 0,0337 0,0326 0,0341 0,0314 0,0389 2004 0,1096 0,1169 0,1081 0,1070 0,1070 2004 -0,0011 -0,0001 -0,0006 0,0068 0,0128
[2.464]** [2.545]** [2.841]*** [2.942]*** [2.411]** [1,981]** [2.479]** [2.648]*** [2.523]** [2.302]** [-0,184] [-0.703] [-0.74] [1.293] [1.61]
2005 0,0335 0,0325 0,0341 0,0304 0,0368 2005 0,1125 0,1128 0,1051 0,1081 0,1062 2005 -0,0029 -0,0001 -0,0004 0,0060 0,0083
[2.547]** [2.802]*** [3.087]*** [3.064]*** [2.437]** [2,053]** [2.664]*** [2.806]*** [2.659]*** [2.427]** [-0,636] [-1.136] [-0.589] [1.24] [1.146]
2006 0,0384 0,0390 0,0408 0,0364 0,0444 2006 0,1039 0,1106 0,1015 0,1006 0,0977 2006 -0,0011 -0,0001 -0,0006 0,0014 0,0083
[2.263]** [2.362]** [2.605]*** [2.779]*** [2.197]** [1,603] [2.13]** [2.274]** [2.148]** [1.925]* [-0,139] [-1.293] [-0.681] [0.276] [1.037]
Takeup -0,0107 -0,0111 -0,0101 -0,0141 -0,0062 Takeup 0,0809 0,0837 0,0800 0,0751 0,0728 Volatility 0,0039 0,0000 0,0003 0,0018 -0,0005
[-0.671] [-0.838] [-0.781] [-1.178] [-0.364] [1,186] [1.597] [1.695]* [1.592] [1.407] [0,755] [0] [0.636] [0.463] [-0.033]
Volatility 0,0248 0,0239 0,0245 0,0237 0,0144 Volatility 0,0328 0,0342 0,0304 0,0319 -0,0093 Pre SEO Liquidity -0,3985 -0,6184 -0,3487 -0,2562 -0,5103
[3.593]*** [3.531]*** [3.719]*** [4.023]*** [1.843]* [1,024] [1.229] [1.206] [1.168] [-0.328] [-3,547]*** [-3.729]*** [-2.152]** [-2.298]** [-2.26]**
Pre-SEO Liquidity 0,1902 7,7764 0,5427 0,0280 0,1906 Pre SEO liquidity 0,3056 -60,1571 -2,9299 0,0973 0,6316 Proceeds -0,0014 0,0000 0,0000 -0,0002 -0,0019
[2.235]** [0.599] [0.463] [1.383] [1.248] [1,173] [-1.35] [-0.834] [1.414] [1.497] [-1,69]* [0.358] [0.06] [-0.393] [-1.893]*
Proceeds -0,0040 -0,0049 -0,0049 -0,0048 -0,0051 Proceeds -0,0104 -0,0144 -0,0137 -0,0113 -0,0102 Free float variation 0,0162 0,0001 0,0005 -0,0005 0,0412
[-2.667]*** [-2.869]*** [-2.759]*** [-3.716]*** [-2.899]*** [-1,957]* [-2.245]** [-2.217]** [-2.323]** [-2.162]** [0,456] [0.462] [0.134] [-0.03] [0.926]
Standby rights 0,0530 0,0469 0,0496 0,0429 0,0604 Acquisition 0,0496 0,0491 0,0482 0,0492 0,0498 Standby rights  -0,0085 -0,0002 -0,0021 -0,0051 0,0094
[1.892]* [2.006]** [2.268]** [2.198]** [1.868]* [3,211]*** [3.226]*** [3.27]*** [3.292]*** [3.311]*** [-0,702] [-1.768]* [-1.852]* [-0.838] [0.883]
Public Offerings 0,0385 0,0316 0,0339 0,0290 0,0443 Standby rights  0,1403 0,1409 0,1275 0,1262 0,1290 Public Offerings -0,0169 -0,0002 -0,0026 -0,0110 -0,0025
[1.461] [1.539] [1.741]* [1.549] [1.508] [1,156] [1.628] [1.749]* [1.584] [1.414] [-1,371] [-2.115]** [-2.248]** [-1.746]* [-0.206]
Public Offerings 0,1113 0,1059 0,0979 0,0996 0,1067
[1,087] [1.401] [1.504] [1.396] [1.298]
Adjusted R² -12,00% 0,86% 9,82% -35,77% Adjusted R² -31,21% -27,45% -21,62% -21,64% -23,71% Adjusted R² 17,79% 38,07% 3,49% 17,84% 35,28%
Wald test public/stan 3,048 3,069 3,273 3,426 3,029 Wald test public/sta 0,72 1,33 1,06 0,86 0,61 Wald test public/stand 2,742 0,423 0,832 1,997 1,223
p value Wald [0.083]* [0.082]* [0.072]* [0.066]* [0.084]* pvalue Wald 0,398 0,251 0,305 0,355 0,436 p value Wald 0,010* 0,516 0,363 0,160 0,270
Panel A. 2SLS analysis of flotation costs  Panel B. 2SLS analysis of abnormal returns  Panel C. 2SLS analysis of abnormal liquidity 
The table reports the 2-stage least square regression results.  They use the predicted probabilities from the multinomial logit estimated in Table 5 as instrumental variables for alternative issue choices in least square regressions. In Panel A, the dependant variable is flotation costs on gross proceeds; 
In Panel B, the dependent variable is the CAR [-1,0] around the announcement date and in Panel C, dependent variables are abnormal liquidity measures such as abnormal spread (model 1), abnormal amihud illquidity ratio (model 2), sqr abnormal amihud illiquidity ratio (model 3), abnormal LOT 
(model 4)  and abnormal Roll (model 5). Those measures were estimated as the difference between observed liquidity after the subscription [+30,+180] period and its average value over the estimation period (Pre SEO liquidity). The  explanatory variables are year dummies, takeup defined as the  % 
of the issue taken up by blockholders, volatility computed over the [-10,-5] period before the subscription period, Pre SEO liquidity measures, proceeds defined as log of gross proceeds (in million €),  acquisition dummy (equals to 1 if the funds raised are used to finance a specific acquisition),free float 
expected variation, Public offerings and Standby rights issues dummies. Pre SEO liquidity measures include spread (model 1) defined as the difference between the ask and bid prices divided by the spread midpoint; Amihud illiquidity ratio (model 2) estimated as 1/NΣ(|Rt|/|VOL €t|) where N is the numbe
t. statistics are in brackets;  *,**,*** represent the significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 